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a b s t r a c t
If a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best
response adjustment path, as well as every non-discriminatory individual best response
improvement path, ends at a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps. If a game
is weakly dominance solvable, then every strategy profile can be connected to a Nash
equilibrium with a simultaneous best response path and with an individual best response
path (if there are more than two players, switches from one best response to another may
be needed). Both statements remain valid if dominance solvability in the usual sense is
replaced with ‘‘BR-dominance solvability’’, where a strategy can be eliminated if it is not
among the best responses to anything, or if it is not indispensable for providing the best
responses to all contingencies. For a two person game, some implications in the opposite
direction are obtained.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Moulin [13] demonstrated connections between dominance solvability and nice behavior of best response dynamics,
although he worked in a rather narrow context. Here we strive to produce a complete picture of ‘‘what depends on what’’.
For technical convenience, we only consider finite games, where we can essentially restrict ourselves to finite improvement
(or adjustment) paths; in a continuous game, this would be insufficient. Similarly, iterative elimination of dominated
strategies in an infinite game raises quite a few complicated questions [3]; in particular, very much depends on topological
assumptions.
An apparently new notion of BR-dominance solvability is introduced; to be more precise, two versions of the notion. We
assume that a strategy can be eliminated if it is not among the best responses to any profile of strategies of the partners/rivals,
or if it is not indispensable for providing the best responses to all contingencies. This novelty allows us to formulate the
weakest conditions for nice behavior of both sequential and simultaneous tâtonnement processes based on dominance
solvability; in particular, weak dominance solvability has the same implications as the strict one if all best responses are
unique. It also makes possible implications in the opposite direction and even equivalence results. One result of the type
was obtained by Moulin [13, Corollary of Lemmas 1 and 2], but, again, in a very special case.
Our basic model is a strategic game with ordinal preferences. It is defined by a finite set of players N , and strategy sets Xi
and preference relations on XN =i∈N Xi for all i ∈ N . We always assume that each Xi is finite and preferences are described
with ordinal utility functions ui: XN → R. For each i ∈ N , we denote X−i =j∈N\{i} Xj and
Ri(x−i) = Argmaxxi∈Xiui(xi, x−i)
for every x−i ∈ X−i (the best response correspondence); if #N = 2, then−i denotes the partner/rival of player i.
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2. Improvement paths
Given a strategic game Γ , we introduce the individual improvement relation ◃Ind and best response improvement relation
◃BR on XN (i ∈ N, yN , xN ∈ XN):
yN ◃Indi xN 
 [y−i = x−i and ui(yN) > ui(xN)],
yN ◃Ind xN 
 ∃i ∈ N[yN ◃Indi xN ];
yN ◃BRi xN 
 [y−i = x−i and xi ∉ Ri(x−i) ∋ yi],
yN ◃BR xN 
 ∃i ∈ N[yN ◃BRi xN ].
By definition, a strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if xN is a maximizer of ◃Ind, i.e., if yN ◃Ind xN is
impossible for any yN ∈ XN . In a finite game, xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if xN is a maximizer of ◃BR.
A (best response) improvement path is a finite or infinite sequence ⟨xkN⟩k∈N such that xk+1N ◃Ind xkN (xk+1N ◃BR xkN) whenever
k ≥ 0 and xk+1N is defined.
As in [7], we combine the terminology of [11,10,4]. A game has the finite improvement property (FIP) if it admits no infinite
improvement path. A game has the finite best response improvement property (FBRP) if it admits no infinite best response
improvement path. The FIP (FBRP) implies that every (best response) improvement path reaches a Nash equilibrium in a
finite number of steps. A game has the weak FIP (weak FBRP) if, for every xN ∈ XN , there exists a finite (best response)
improvement path ⟨x0N , . . . , xmN ⟩ such that x0N = xN and xmN is a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, FIP⇒FBRP⇒weak FBRP⇒weak
FIP.
A Cournot potential is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation≻ on XN such that yN ≻ xN whenever yN ◃BR xN ; aweak
Cournot potential is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation ≻ on XN such that, whenever xN is not a Nash equilibrium,
there is yN ∈ XN such that yN ◃BR xN and yN ≻ xN . By [6, Propositions 6.1 and 6.2], a finite game has the (weak) FBRP if and
only if it admits a (weak) Cournot potential. Henceforth, best response improvement paths will be called just Cournot paths;
clearly, the FBRP is equivalent to the absence of Cournot cycles, i.e., Cournot paths ⟨x0N , x1N , . . . , xmN ⟩ such that m > 0 and
x0N = xmN .
A property intermediate between the FBRP and weak FBRP deserves attention. We call an infinite Cournot path ⟨xkN⟩k∈N
inclusive if for each player i ∈ N and each m ∈ N, there is a k ≥ m such that xki ∈ Ri(xk−i). A game has the finite inclusive
best response improvement property (FIBRP) if it admits no infinite inclusive Cournot path. It is immediately clear that the
FIBRP implies, in particular, the convergence of the sequential tâtonnement process [13, p. 87] in a finite number of steps. A
Cournot cycle ⟨x0N , x1N , . . . , xmN = x0N⟩ is complete if for each player i ∈ N there is k < m such that xki ∈ Ri(xk−i).
A preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation; with every preorder ≽, its asymmetric component ≻ and an
equivalence relation∼ are naturally associated. A Cournot quasipotential is a preorder≽ on XN such that for every xN ∈ XN
there exists a subsetM(xN) ⊆ N satisfying
yN ◃BR xN ⇒ [yN ≻ xN or [yN ∼ xN andM(yN) ⊆ M(xN) ≠ ∅]]; (1a)
i ∈ M(xN)⇒ xi ∉ Ri(x−i). (1b)
If≻ is a Cournot potential, then its reflexive closure≽ is a Cournot quasipotential withM(xN) = ∅ for all xN ∈ XN . If≽ is a
Cournot quasipotential, then we may extend its asymmetric component in this way:
yN % xN 
 [yN ≻ xN or [yN ∼ xN andM(yN) ⊂ M(xN)]].
Clearly, yN % xN whenever yN ◃BRi xN and i ∈ M(xN); therefore, % is a weak Cournot potential.
Proposition 2.1. For every finite strategic game Γ , the following statements are equivalent:
1. Γ has the FIBRP;
2. Γ admits no complete Cournot cycle;
3. Γ admits a Cournot quasipotential.
Proof. Infinite repetition of a complete Cournot cycle generates an infinite inclusive Cournot path, hence Statement 1
implies Statement 2.
Let Statement 2 hold. To verify Statement 3, we denote≽ the reflexive and transitive closure of◃BR : yN ≽ xN if and only
if there is a finite Cournot path ⟨x0N , x1N , . . . , xmN ⟩ such that x0N = xN and xmN = yN (m ≥ 0). Let Y ⊆ XN be an equivalence
class of its symmetric component∼, and let #Y > 1; we denote D(Y ) = {i ∈ N | ∀xN ∈ Y [xi ∉ Ri(x−i)]}. Since all xN ∈ Y
can be arranged into a single Cournot cycle and that cycle cannot be complete, D(Y ) ≠ ∅. Now we defineM(xN) = D(Y ) if
xN belongs to a non-singleton equivalence class Y , andM(xN) = ∅ otherwise. The conditions (1) are checked easily.
Finally, let ≽ be a Cournot quasipotential and ⟨xkN⟩k∈N be an infinite Cournot path; we have to show that the path is not
inclusive. Since XN is finite, at least one strategy profile x¯N must enter into the path an infinite number of times. Let xmN = x¯N
for the first time; clearly, we must have xk+1N ∼ xkN for all k ≥ m. By (1a), M(xk+1N ) = M(xkN) = M0 ≠ ∅ for all k ≥ m. By
(1b), we have xki ∉ Ri(xk−i) for all i ∈ M0 and k ≥ m. 
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Remark. In the proof of Theorem 3 of [6], the FBRP was derived from the presence of a ‘‘quasipotential’’ in an even weaker
sense than (1). The point is that whenever a game satisfies the conditions of that theorem, so do all its reduced games.
Generally, we only obtain FIBRP. In particular, dominance solvability (in any sense) need not be inherited by the reduced
games, hence Theorem 4.3 also asserts only FIBRP.
We introduce the simultaneous best response adjustment relation ◃sBR on XN (yN , xN ∈ XN):
yN ◃sBR xN 
 [∀i ∈ N[yi = xi ∈ Ri(x−i) or xi ∉ Ri(x−i) ∋ yi] and yN ≠ xN ].
In a finite game, xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium if and only if xN is a maximizer of ◃sBR. A simultaneous Cournot path is a finite
or infinite sequence ⟨xkN⟩k=0,1,... such that xk+1N ◃sBR xkN whenever k ≥ 0 and xk+1N is defined.
Remark. We do not use the term ‘‘improvement’’ here because yN ◃sBR xN is compatible with ui(yN) < ui(xN) for all i ∈ N .
A game has the finite simultaneous best response adjustment property (FSBRP) if there exists no infinite simultaneous
Cournot path. The FSBRP implies that every simultaneous Cournot path eventually leads to a Nash equilibrium. A game
has the weak FSBRP if, for every xN ∈ XN , there exists a finite simultaneous Cournot path ⟨x0N , . . . , xmN ⟩ such that x0N = xN
and xmN is a Nash equilibrium.
A simultaneous Cournot potential is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation ≻ on XN such that yN ≻ xN whenever
yN ◃sBR xN ; aweak simultaneous Cournot potential is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation≻ on XN such that, whenever
xN is not a Nash equilibrium, there is yN ∈ XN such that yN ◃sBR xN and yN ≻ xN . By [6, Propositions 6.1 and 6.2], a finite
game has the (weak) FSBRP if and only if it admits a (weak) simultaneous Cournot potential.
Generally, there seems to be no relation between the convergence of Cournot paths and simultaneous Cournot paths [14].
An exception is the case of two players, see Section 5.
A pseudo-Cournot path is a finite or infinite sequence ⟨xkN⟩k=0,1,... such that, whenever xk+1N is defined, there is i ∈ N
for which xk+1−i = xk−i, xk+1i ≠ xki , and xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i). A simultaneous pseudo-Cournot path is a finite or infinite sequence
⟨xkN⟩k=0,1,... such that xk+1N ≠ xkN and xk+1i ∈ Ri(xk−i) for all i ∈ N whenever xk+1N is defined. A game has the pseudo-FBRP
(pseudo-FSBRP) if, for every xN ∈ XN , there exists a finite (simultaneous) pseudo-Cournot path ⟨x0N , . . . , xmN ⟩ such that
x0N = xN and xmN is a Nash equilibrium.
3. Elimination of dominated strategies
The term ‘‘dominance solvability’’ is due to Moulin [12] although the origins of the notion itself can be traced back to [8].
The elimination of strictly dominated strategies does not change, say, the set of Nash equilibria. The elimination of weakly
dominated strategies is not at all innocuous [16], but, nonetheless, is often regarded as legitimate.
Let Γ be a strategic game, i ∈ N , and xi, yi ∈ Xi. We say that yi strictly dominates xi if for every x−i ∈ X−i, there
holds ui(yi, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i). We say that yi weakly dominates xi if ui(yi, x−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i) for every x−i ∈ X−i, while
ui(yi, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i) for some x−i ∈ X−i.
Given a strategic game Γ , an elimination scheme of length m ≥ 0 is a collection of sequences Xki for i ∈ N and
k = 0, 1, . . . ,m such that X0i = Xi and ∅ ≠ Xk+1i ⊆ Xki for each i and k. Naturally, a sequence of subgames Γ k of Γ is
associated with such a scheme: the set of players remains the same; the strategy sets are Xki ; the preferences are defined
by the restrictions of the same utility functions to XkN =

i∈N X
k
i . An elimination scheme of lengthm ≥ 0 is perfect if every
xN ∈ XmN is a Nash equilibrium in Γ m.
A game Γ is strictly/weakly dominance solvable if it admits a perfect elimination scheme such that, for each k ∈
{0, . . . ,m− 1}, every deleted strategy xi ∈ Xki \ Xk+1i is strictly/weakly dominated in Γ k.
Remark. A more usual requirement is that each player should become indifferent between all outcomes when the
elimination process is completed; our perfect schemes do not ensure that. However, our weaker condition is sufficient for
all ‘‘nice’’ conclusions.
Given X ′i ⊆ Xi, we denote R−1i (X ′i ) = {x−i ∈ X−i | Ri(x−i) ∩ X ′i ≠ ∅}. When X ′i = {xi}, we write R−1i (xi) rather than
R−1i ({xi}). A strategy xi ∈ Xi is strongly BR-dominated if R−1i (xi) = ∅. It is immediately clear that a strictly dominated strategy
is strongly BR-dominated. A subset X ′i ⊆ Xi is BR-sufficient if R−1i (X ′i ) = X−i.
An S-scheme is an elimination scheme of length m such that every xi ∈ Xki \ Xk+1i is strongly BR-dominated in Γ k
(k ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}). A W-scheme is an elimination scheme of length m such that every Xk+1i is BR-sufficient in Γ k
(k ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}). We call Γ strongly/weakly BR-dominance solvable (SBRDS /WBRDS) if it admits a perfect S-scheme/W-
scheme.
The idea of iterative elimination of strongly BR-dominated strategies was implicit in [13, Lemma 2], where it was shown
to lead to the same result as the elimination of strictly dominated strategies (under rather strong assumptions, naturally).
Generally, it can be viewed as an ordinal analogue of the rationalizability concept [1,15]. Admittedly, there is a serious
difference between the two situations: If a pure strategy is not a best response to any probability distribution on the
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strategies of the other players, then it is dominated by a mixed strategy, hence the latter provides a justification for the
elimination of the former. When only pure strategies are allowed, the fact that a strategy is not a best response to any
profile of strategies of the partners does not make it inferior to any other strategy.
An ordinal version of rationalizability was developed in [2], but its departure from conventional notions of dominance
was less radical than here. Actually, the question of which strategies are not needed by a player can only be resolved with
a particular scenario (or a list of scenarios) in view; e.g., the Stackelberg solution of a two person game may well include
the choice of a strictly dominated strategy by the leader. And it is easy to see that the elimination of strongly BR-dominated
strategies does not change the set of Nash equilibria.
Since BR-dominance solvability seems to have never been studied in the literature, we provide exact formulations and
proofs of familiar properties in the new context. Three implications are obvious: a strictly (weakly) dominance solvable
game is strongly (weakly) BR-dominance solvable with the same elimination scheme; an SBRDS game is WBRDS.
Proposition 3.1. If x0N is a Nash equilibrium in Γ , then x
0
N ∈ XkN for every S-scheme of length m ≥ k.
Proof. Supposing the contrary, let k be the first step when x0N ∉ XkN ; then x0i ∈ Xk−1i \ Xki for some i ∈ N , hence x0i is strongly
BR-dominated in Γ k−1. On the other hand, x0i ∈ Ri(x0−i) in Γ and x0−i ∈ Xk−1−i : a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.2. Given a W-scheme of length m, each best response correspondence Rki (i ∈ N and k ∈ {0, . . . ,m}) in Γ k satisfies
Rki (x−i) = Ri(x−i) ∩ Xki [≠ ∅] for every x−i ∈ Xk−i.
Proof. Straightforward induction based on the definition of a W-scheme shows Ri(x−i) ∩ Xki ≠ ∅; the rest is obvious. 
Proposition 3.3. If Γ is WBRDS and xN ∈ XmN , then xN is a Nash equilibrium in Γ .
Proof. For each i ∈ N , we apply Lemma 3.2 to x−i ∈ Xm−i and pick yi ∈ Ri(x−i) ∩ Xmi . By the definition of a perfect scheme,
ui(yi, x−i) = ui(xN), hence xi ∈ Ri(x−i) as well. 
Propositions 3.1 and 3.3 immediately imply that the set of Nash equilibria in a strongly BR-dominance solvable game is
rectangular, and all perfect S-schemes eventually eliminate the strategies not participating in the equilibria. As to perfect
W-schemes, every such scheme can be extended until XmN becomes a singleton; however, which Nash equilibrium of the
original game will be selected may depend on the particular elimination scheme. This dependence remains possible in the
case of weak dominance solvability, but can be ruled out under reasonable assumptions [5,9].
4. Implications of BR-dominance solvability
Given an elimination scheme of lengthm, we define µi: Xi → {0, . . . ,m} by
µi(xi) = max{k ∈ {0, . . . ,m} | xi ∈ Xki }. (2)
Then we define µ−: XN → {0, . . . ,m} by
µ−(xN) = min
i∈N µi(xi). (3)
Lemma 4.1. Let there be an S-scheme of length m and xN ∈ XN such that µ−(xN) < m; then for every i ∈ N and yi ∈ Ri(x−i),
there holds µi(yi) > µ−(xN).
Proof. We have x−i ∈ Xµ−(xN )−i , hence yi ∈ Xµ
−(xN )+1
i since yi ∈ Ri(x−i); therefore, µi(yi) ≥ µ−(xN)+ 1. 
Theorem 4.2. If a finite game Γ is SBRDS, then it has the FSBRP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect S-scheme, we consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (2) and (3). Let us show that the strict
ordering represented by µ−, i.e.,
yN ≻ xN 
 µ−(yN) > µ−(xN),
is a simultaneous Cournot potential. Let yN ◃sBR xN ; then µ−(xN) < m. By Lemma 4.1, µi(yi) > µ−(xN) for every i ∈ N ,
hence µ−(yN) > µ−(xN) as well. 
Theorem 4.3. If a finite game Γ is SBRDS, then it has the FIBRP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect S-scheme, we again consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (2) and (3). Let us show that the
total preorder represented by µ−, i.e.,
yN ≽ xN 
 µ−(yN) ≥ µ−(xN),
is a Cournot quasipotential with M(xN) = Argmini∈Nµi(xi) when µ−(xN) < m and M(xN) = ∅ otherwise. If µ−(xN) = m,
then xN ∈ XmN , hence xN is a Nash equilibrium in Γ by Proposition 3.3.
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Let yN ◃BRi xN ; then µ
−(xN) < m, hence Lemma 4.1 is applicable. If i ∉ M(xN), then µ−(yN) = µ−(xN) and M(yN) =
M(xN). Let i ∈ M(xN); thenµi(yi) > µ−(xN), hence eitherµ−(yN) > µ−(xN) orµ−(yN) = µ−(xN) andM(yN) = M(xN)\{i}.
We see that condition (1a) holds. Finally, if i ∈ M(xN), then µi(xi) = µ−(xN) < m; if xi ∈ Ri(x−i), then Lemma 4.1 would
imply µi(xi) > µi(xi). Thus, (1b) holds as well. 
The FIBRP in the formulation of Theorem 4.3 cannot be replaced with the FBRP if there are more than two players: if one
player has a strictly dominant strategy x+i , then any behavior of improvement paths with x
k
i ≠ x+i is compatible with strict
dominance solvability. When #N = 2, Theorem 5.2 asserts the FBRP.
Lemma 4.4. Let there be a W-scheme of length m and xN ∈ XN such that µ−(xN) < m; then for each i ∈ N there is yi ∈ Ri(x−i)
such that µi(yi) > µ−(xN).
Proof. For each i ∈ N , we pick yi maximizingµi over Ri(x−i). The definition of aW-scheme implies thatµi(yi) ≥ µ−(xN)+1
because x−i ∈ Xµ−(xN )−i . 
Theorem 4.5. If a finite game is WBRDS, then it has the pseudo-FSBRP and pseudo-FBRP.
Proof. Fixing a perfect W-scheme, we consider the functions µ and µ− defined by (2) and (3). As above, if µ−(xN) = m,
then xN is already a Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, we pick yi maximizing µ over Ri(x−i) for each i ∈ N .
To prove the first statement, we notice that ⟨xN , yN⟩ is a simultaneous pseudo-Cournot path. By Lemma 4.4, µ−(yN) >
µ−(xN). If yN is not a Nash equilibrium, we make a similar step, and so on. Thus we obtain a simultaneous pseudo-Cournot
path along which µ− strictly increases until a Nash equilibrium is reached.
To prove the second statement, we pick i ∈ Argmini∈Nµi(xi). This time, ⟨xN , (yi, x−i)⟩ is a pseudo-Cournot path; by
Lemma 4.4, we have either µ−(yi, x−i) > µ−(xN) or µ−(yi, x−i) = µ−(xN) and M(yi, x−i) ⊂ M(xN). The final argument is
virtually the same as in the previous paragraph. 
5. Two person games
Proposition 5.1. If a finite two person game Γ has the FIBRP or FSBRP, then it has the FBRP.
Proof. In the first case, Γ admits no complete Cournot cycle by Proposition 2.1; on the other hand, best response
improvements by one player cannot form a cycle in any game. In the second case, we notice that yN ◃sBR xN whenever
yN ◃BR xN and xi ∈ Ri(x−i) for an i ∈ N . Therefore, every Cournot path becomes a simultaneous Cournot path after the first
step. 
Theorem 5.2. If a finite two person game Γ is SBRDS, then it has the FBRP.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Theorem 4.3 and Proposition 5.1. 
The FBRP in the formulation of Theorem 5.2 cannot be replacedwith the FIP: if one player has a strictly dominant strategy
x+i , then any behavior of improvement paths with x
k
i ≠ x+i is compatible with strict dominance solvability.
Proposition 5.3. If a finite two person game Γ has the pseudo-FBRP, then it has the weak FBRP.
Proof. Let Γ have the pseudo-FBRP and x0N ∈ XN . If x0N is a Nash equilibrium, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, there
is x1N ∈ XN such that x1N ◃BR x0N . If x1N is a Nash equilibrium, we are home again. Otherwise, there is a pseudo-Cournot path
⟨x1N , . . . , xmN ⟩ such that xmN is a Nash equilibrium; without restricting generality, we assume that no shorter pseudo-Cournot
path from x1N to an equilibrium exists. If ⟨x1N , . . . , xmN ⟩ happens to be a Cournot path, we are home once again. Otherwise, let
k (1 ≤ k < m) be the least where xk+1N ◃BR xkN does not hold, i.e., xk+1−i = xk−i and xki ∈ Ri(xk−i) ∋ xk+1i for an i ∈ N . On the
other hand, we have xkN ◃
BR xk−1N , hence x
k−1
j ∉ Rj(xk−j) ∋ xkj for a j ∈ N . Now if i ≠ j, then xkN is a Nash equilibrium, hence
the path ⟨x1N , . . . , xmN ⟩ is not the shortest. If i = j, then we have xk+1N ◃BRixk−1N , hence the path ⟨x1N , . . . , xk−1N , xk+1N , . . . , xmN ⟩ is
a shorter pseudo-Cournot path from x1N to x
m
N . 
Proposition 5.4. If a finite two person game Γ has the pseudo-FSBRP, then it has the weak FBRP and weak FSBRP.
Proof. Let Γ have the pseudo-FSBRP and x0N ∈ XN ; then there is a simultaneous pseudo-Cournot path ⟨x0N , . . . , xmN ⟩ such
that xmN is a Nash equilibrium. We define a sequence ⟨y0N , y1N , . . . , ym+1N ⟩ in this way: y0N = x0N; y2k+11 = x2k+11 ; y2k+12 =
x2k2 ; y2k+21 = x2k+11 ; y2k+22 = x2k+22 ; if 2k = m, we set ym+11 = xm1 ; if 2k+ 1 = m, we set ym+12 = xm2 . Thus, ym+1N = xmN in either
case.
By our construction, for each k = 0, 1, . . . ,m we have yk+1i ∈ Ri(yk−i) and yk+1−i = yk−i for an i ∈ N; therefore,
⟨y0N , y1N , . . . , ym+1N ⟩ is a pseudo-Cournot path ending at a Nash equilibrium. Since x0N ∈ XN was arbitrary, Γ has the pseudo-
FBRP. Now Proposition 5.3 implies the weak FBRP.
Let us show that Γ has the weak FSBRP as well. Given x0N ∈ XN , there is again a simultaneous pseudo-Cournot path
⟨x0N , . . . , xmN ⟩ such that xmN is a Nash equilibrium. If xk+1N ◃sBR xkN for each k = 1, . . . ,m, ‘‘pseudo’’ can be dropped, and we are
home. Otherwise, let k¯ be the first moment when xki ∈ Ri(xk−i), but xk+1i ≠ xki for an i ∈ N . If xk−i ∈ Ri(xki ), then xkN is a Nash
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equilibrium, and we are home again. Supposing xk−i ∉ Ri(xki ) and denoting y0N = (xki , xk+1−i ), we have y0N ◃sBR xkN . Since Γ has
the weak FBRP, there is a Cournot path starting at y0N and ending at a Nash equilibrium. Since y
0
−i ∈ R−i(y0i ), the path is a
simultaneous Cournot path as well, exactly as in the proof of Proposition 5.1. 
Theorem 5.5. If a finite two person game is WBRDS, then it has the weak FSBRP and the weak FBRP.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Theorem 4.5 and Proposition 5.4. 
6. Main necessity results
A very interesting feature of [13] is an equivalence result (Corollary of Lemmas 1 and 2), even though obtained in a rather
special case. From our current viewpoint, that result is just a fortunate coincidence: when all best responses are unique,
both levels of BR-dominance solvability become equivalent. Generally, it seems impossible to derive strong BR-dominance
solvability from any nice property of best response dynamics. There also seems to be no necessity result whatsoever for
games with more than two players.
The Battle of Sexes, which has the FIP but is not evenWBRDS, sets limits to necessity results. An obvious way around the
example is to notice that it does not have even the weak FSBRP. Another, unexpectedly helpful, observation is that the set
of Nash equilibria in the Battle of Sexes is not rectangular.
Theorem 6.1. If a finite two person game Γ has the weak FBRP and the set of Nash equilibria in Γ is rectangular, then Γ is
WBRDS.
Proof. We assume that the set of Nash equilibria in Γ is Y 0N and recursively define Y
k
N for all k ∈ N by Y k+1i = R−1−i (Y k−i).
Claim 6.1.1. Y kN ⊆ Y hN whenever k, h ∈ N and h ≥ k.
Proof. Straightforward induction starting with Y 0i ⊆ R−1−i (Y 0−i) = Y 1i . 
Since XN is finite, the sequence Y kN stabilizes at some stage m¯ ∈ N.
Claim 6.1.2. Let x0N , . . . , x
m
N be a Cournot path such that x
m
N ∈ Y 0N . Then xki ∈ Y m¯i for each i ∈ N and k = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof. We argue by backward induction along the path. There is no problem with m = 0 or k = m, so we are home
immediately if m ≤ 1. Let m > 1 and xmN ◃BRi xm−1N ; then xm−1−i = xm−i ∈ Y 0−i and xm−1−i ∈ R−i(xm−1i ); therefore, xm−1i ∈
R−1i (x
m−1
−i ) ⊆ R−1i (Y 0−i) = Y 1i . Iterating this argument, we come to x1i ∈ Ym−1i for both i; however, we cannot say anything
about x0i such that x
1
N ◃
BR
i x
0
N . 
Claim 6.1.3. There holds Y m¯N = XN .
Proof. Let i ∈ N and xi ∈ Xi \ Y 0i . We start with picking x−i ∈ Y 0−i. If x−i ∈ R−i(xi), then xi ∈ Y 1i ⊆ Y m¯i . Otherwise,
we pick x′−i ∈ R−i(xi) and have (xi, x′−i)◃BR−i xN . Since Γ has the weak FBRP, there is a Cournot path from (xi, x′−i) to a Nash
equilibrium. Since xi ∉ Y 0i , the length of the path is strictly positive. Adding xN to the path at the left and invoking Claim 6.1.2,
we have xi ∈ Y m¯i . 
Now the sequences Xki = Y m¯−ki (i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . , m¯) form a perfect W-scheme. 
Corollary. If a finite two person game Γ has the weak FBRP and the set of Nash equilibria in Γ is rectangular, then Γ has the
weak FSBRP.
Proof. By Theorem 6.1, Γ is WBRDS. Therefore, Γ has the weak FSBRP by Theorem 5.5. 
Theorem 6.2. If a finite two person game Γ has the weak FSBRP, then Γ is WBRDS.
Proof. Without restricting generality, N = {1, 2}. Given a Nash equilibrium xN ∈ XN , we define Y 0N(xN) = {xN}, and then
recursively define Y ki (xN) for both i and all k ∈ N in essentially the same way as in the proof of Theorem 6.1: Y k+1i (xN)
= R−1−i (Y k−i(xN)).
Claim 6.2.1. Y ki (xN) ⊆ Y hi (xN) whenever i ∈ N, k, h ∈ N, and h ≥ k.
The proof is the same as in Theorem 6.1. Exactly as in the same proof, the sequence Y kN(xN) stabilizes at some stage m¯ ∈ N.
Since XN is finite, the same m¯will do for all Nash equilibria xN .
Claim 6.2.2. Let xN , yN ∈ XN , xN be a Nash equilibrium, and there be a simultaneous Cournot path starting at yN and ending at
xN . Then yN ∈ Y m¯N (xN).
Proof. The same backward induction along the path as in the proof of Theorem 6.1. 
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Claim 6.2.3. If xN and yN are Nash equilibria and xN ∈ Y m¯N (yN), then Y m¯N (xN) ⊆ Y m¯N (yN).
Proof. Let xN ∈ Ym(yN). Straightforward induction along the definition of Y k(xN) shows that Y k(xN) ⊆ Ym+k(yN) for all
k ∈ N. 
Claim 6.2.4. There exists a Nash equilibrium xN ∈ XN such that Y m¯N (xN) = XN .
Proof. Let us pick a Nash equilibrium x0N ∈ XN with a maximal Y m¯N (x0N). If Y m¯N (x0N) = XN , then we are home. Supposing the
contrary, we may, w.r.g., assume the existence of x1 ∈ X1 \ Y m¯1 (x0N) [actually, if Y m¯N (x0N) ≠ XN , then Y m¯i (x0N) ≠ Xi for both i];
then (x1, x02) ∉ Y m¯N (x0N). By the weak FSBRP and Claim 6.2.2, there is a Nash equilibrium yN ∈ XN such that (x1, x02) ∈ Y m¯N (yN).
Let k ∈ N be such that x02 ∈ Y k2 (yN); then x01 ∈ Y k+11 (yN) since x02 ∈ R1(x01). Therefore, x0N ∈ Y m¯N (yN), hence Y m¯N (x0N) ⊂ Y m¯N (yN)
by Claim 6.2.3, contradicting the choice of x0N . 
We pick a Nash equilibrium xN ∈ XN as in Claim 6.2.4 and finish the proof in exactly the sameway as in Theorem 6.1. 
Corollary. A finite two person game has the weak FSBRP if and only if it is WBRDS.
Remark. In the light of Propositions 5.3 and 5.4, there would be no point in distinguishing between the weak F(S)BRP and
pseudo-F(S)BRP.
7. Intermediate BR-dominance
Although strong BR-dominance solvability does not follow from the FBRP or FSBRP, something stronger than weak BR-
dominance solvability can be derived. Unfortunately, those intermediate versions are not sufficient for the FBRP or FSBRP,
nor for any nicer properties of Cournot dynamics than those following from weak BR-dominance solvability.
Let xi, yi ∈ Xi; we say that yi (strictly) BR-dominates xi in an intermediate sense, denoting the fact yi≽≽i xi (yi≻≻i xi), if
yi ≠ xi and R−1i (xi) ⊆ R−1i (yi) (R−1i (xi) ⊂ R−1i (yi)); note that ≻≻i is the asymmetric component of ≽≽i. It is immediately
clear that yi≽≽i xi whenever yi weakly dominates xi or xi is strongly BR-dominated.
An I-scheme (I!-scheme) is an elimination scheme of length m such that, for every k ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} and every
xi ∈ Xki \ Xk+1i , there is yi ∈ Xk+1i such that yi≽≽i xi (yi≻≻i xi). We call Γ (strictly) BR-dominance solvable in an intermediate
sense (IBRDS/I!BRDS) if it admits a perfect I-scheme (I!-scheme). Obviously, SBRDS⇒I!BRDS⇒IBRDS⇒WBRDS.
Theorem 7.1. If a finite two person game Γ has the FSBRP, then it is IBRDS.
Proof.
Claim 7.1.1. Either every strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium, or Γ contains a strategy BR-dominated in an
intermediate sense.
Proof. Let the first statement not hold: there is, at least, one pair of strategy profiles such that yN ◃sBR xN . Since there is no
simultaneous Cournot cycle, we can pick an x∗N ∈ XN which is not a Nash equilibrium and for which x∗N ◃sBR xN is impossible
for any xN ∈ XN .
For each i ∈ N , we denote X∗−i = R−1i (x∗i ) ⊆ X−i. If X∗−i = ∅ for an i ∈ N , then x∗i is even strongly BR-dominated and we
are home. Let X∗N = X∗1 × X∗2 ≠ ∅. Since x∗N is not a Nash equilibrium, there must be i ∈ N and x0i ∈ X∗i such that x0i ≠ x∗i . If
R−1i (x
0
i ) ⊇ X∗−i, then x0i ≽≽i x∗i and we are home again; otherwise, there is x0−i ∈ X∗−i such that x0i ∉ Ri(x0−i). Since x∗N ◃sBR x0N
is assumed impossible, we must have x∗−i ≠ x0−i ∈ R−i(x0i ). Again, if R−1−i (x0−i) ⊇ X∗i , then x0−i≽≽−i x∗−i. Otherwise, there is
x1i ∈ X∗i such that x0−i ∉ R−i(x1i ); we denote x1N = (x1i , x0−i) ∈ X∗N . Since x∗N ◃sBR x1N is assumed impossible, we must have
x∗i ≠ x1i ∈ Ri(x0−i); therefore, x1N ◃sBR x0N . Again, if R−1i (x1i ) ⊇ X∗−i, then x1i ≽≽i x∗i ; otherwise, there is x2−i ∈ X∗−i such that
x1i ∉ Ri(x2−i). We denote x2N = (x1i , x2−i) ∈ X∗N ; again, x2N ◃sBR x1N ◃sBR x0N , and so on.
Since Γ has the FSBRP, the simultaneous Cournot path ⟨x0N , x1N , . . .⟩ cannot be infinite. On the other hand, the next profile
xk+1N cannot be defined only if x
k
i ≽≽i x∗i for an i ∈ N , hence x∗i is BR-dominated in an intermediate sense. 
If every strategy profile xN ∈ XN is a Nash equilibrium, we are home immediately. Otherwise, we delete (all or some)
strategies BR-dominated in an intermediate sense, obtaining a subgame Γ 1 and an I-scheme of length 1. By Lemma 3.2, we
have R1i (x−i) = Ri(x−i) ∩ X1i for all i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X1−i. Therefore, the relation ◃sBR in Γ 1 is the restriction of ◃sBR in Γ to
X1N , hence Γ
1 also has the FSBRP, hence Claim 7.1.1 applies to Γ 1. The process only stops when every strategy profile in Γ m
is a Nash equilibrium; then the I-scheme will be perfect. 
The Battle of Sexes shows that the FSBRP in Theorem 5.5 cannot be replaced with the FBRP (or even FIP). This becomes
possible under an additional assumption that the set of Nash equilibria is rectangular.
Theorem 7.2. If a finite two person game Γ has the FBRP and the set of Nash equilibria in Γ is rectangular, then Γ is I!BRDS.
Proof. Let the set of Nash equilibria of Γ be X0N = X01 × X02 , where X0i ⊆ Xi for each i ∈ N .
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Claim 7.2.1. Either X0N = XN , or Γ contains a strategy strictly BR-dominated in an intermediate sense.
Proof. Let X0N ⊂ XN . By definition, R−1i (x0i ) ⊇ X0−i for both i ∈ N and all x0i ∈ X0i . We pick an xN ∈ XN \ X0N ≠ ∅ and start a
Cournot path from xN ; since Γ has the FBRP, the path must end at an x∗N ∈ X0N ; therefore, R−1i (x∗i ) ⊃ X0−i for an i ∈ N .
Now we define a binary relation ◃ on Xi:
yi ◃ xi 
 ∃x−i ∈ X−i [xi ∉ Ri(x−i) ∋ yi and x−i ∈ R−i(xi) and x−i ∉ R−i(yi)]. (4)
Let us show that ◃ is acyclic. Supposing to the contrary that x0i , x
1
i , . . . , x
m
i = x0i are such that xk+1i ◃ xki for each
k = 0, . . . ,m − 1, we pick, for each k, an xk−i from (4). Then we define x2kN = (xki , xk−i) and x2k+1N = (xk+1i , xk−i) for each
k = 0, . . . ,m− 1. It follows immediately from (4) that x0N , x1N , . . . , x2mN = x0N is a Cournot cycle in Γ , which contradicts the
FBRP.
Since Xi is finite and ◃ is acyclic, there is yi ∈ Xi such that yi ◃ xi does not hold for any xi ∈ Xi. If R−1i (yi) = ∅, then yi
is even strongly BR-dominated, hence we are home immediately. For every x−i ∈ R−1i (yi), we consider two alternatives: If
x−i ∈ R−i(yi), then (yi, x−i) is a Nash equilibrium, hence x−i ∈ X0−i. If x−i ∉ R−i(yi), then we pick xi ∈ R−1−i (x−i) ≠ ∅; then
xi ∈ Ri(x−i) because we would have yi ◃ xi otherwise; therefore, (xi, x−i) is a Nash equilibrium, hence x−i ∈ X0−i again. Thus,
R−1i (yi) ⊆ X0−i ⊂ R−1i (x∗i ), i.e., yi is strictly BR-dominated in an intermediate sense. 
Now we apply Claim 7.2.1 in the same way as Claim 7.1.1 was applied in the proof of Theorem 7.1. 
8. Unique best responses
The relationship between BR-dominance solvability and nice best response dynamics becomes especially simple in the
case of two person gameswith unique best responses, as in [13]. According to Propositions 8.1 and 8.3, there is then no need
to distinguish between strong and weak versions of the properties. The set of Nash equilibria is rectangular if and only if it
is a singleton.
Proposition 8.1. For every finite game Γ where Ri(x−i) is a singleton for every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, the weak FSBRP implies the
FSBRP. If #N = 2, then the weak FBRP implies the FBRP.
Proof. No more than one simultaneous Cournot path can be started from any xN . Therefore, if there were a simultaneous
Cournot cycle, no equilibrium could be reached from any strategy profile belonging to the cycle. Similarly, nomore than one
Cournot path can be started from xN such that xi ∈ Ri(x−i) for at least one i ∈ N , and every Cournot cycle must consist of
such profiles. 
Lemma 8.2. If Ri(x−i) is a singleton for every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, then every W-scheme is an S-scheme.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ k ≤ m − 1, i ∈ N , and xi ∈ Xki \ Xk+1i . Since Xk+1i is BR-sufficient in Γ k and each Ri(x−i) is a singleton, we
have Ri(Xk−i) ⊆ Xk+1i , hence xi ∉ Ri(Xk−i), hence xi is strongly BR-dominated. 
Proposition 8.3. If Γ is WBRDS and Ri(x−i) is a singleton for every i ∈ N and x−i ∈ X−i, then Γ is SBRDS.
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Lemma 8.2. 
Corollary to Theorems 4.2 and 6.2. Let Γ be a finite two person game such that Ri(x−i) is a singleton for every i ∈ N and
x−i ∈ X−i. Then Γ has the FSBRP if and only if it is SBRDS. 
Corollary to Theorems 4.3 and 6.1. Let Γ be a finite two person game such that Ri(x−i) is a singleton for every i ∈ N and
x−i ∈ X−i, and there is no more than one Nash equilibrium in Γ . Then Γ has the FBRP if and only if it is SBRDS. 
9. ‘‘Counterexamples’’
This section consists of examples showing the impossibility of easy extensions of our results. It should be noted that
the preferences of the players in every game are ‘‘generic on outcomes’’, i.e., whenever a player is indifferent between two
strategy profiles, each other player is indifferent too.
Example 9.1 shows that Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 become wrong if Γ is only weakly dominance solvable (or strictly BR-
dominance solvable in an intermediate sense); Example 9.2 shows the same for Theorem 5.2. Example 9.1 simultaneously
shows that Theorem 5.5 is wrong for more than two players.
Example 9.1. Let us consider a three person 2× 3× 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns, and player 3
matrices):
(3, 3, 3) (2, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2)
(3, 3, 3) (1, 2, 2) (2, 1, 1)
 
(0, 0, 0) (2, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 2, 2) (2, 1, 1).

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Nash equilibria fill the left column of the left matrix; however, none of the underlined strategy profiles could be connected
to any equilibrium with an individual improvement path or with a simultaneous Cournot path. Thus, the game does not
have even the weak FIP or the weak FSBRP. On the other hand, it is weakly dominance solvable: The choice of the left matrix
weakly dominates the choice of the right matrix; there is also strict BR-dominance in an intermediate sense. When the right
matrix is deleted, the left column becomes strictly dominant.
Example 9.2. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(0, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1)
(0, 1) (0, 1) (1, 0)
(2, 2) (1, 0) (1, 0).
The bottom row and the left column are weakly dominant as well as strictly BR-dominant in an intermediate sense. The
southwestern corner of the matrix is a unique Nash equilibrium. The underlined fragment is a Cournot cycle (hence a
simultaneous Cournot cycle as well).
The Battle of Sexes has the FIP, but is not even weakly BR-dominance solvable; therefore, the converse to Theorems 4.3
and 5.2 is wrong. Example 9.3 shows that no general necessity result would be possible without the idea of BR-dominance
solvability. Example 9.4 shows the impossibility to reverse Theorem 5.2 even when the set of Nash equilibria is rectangular.
Example 9.5 shows the impossibility to reverse Theorem 4.2, or assert strict BR-dominance solvability in an intermediate
sense in Theorem 7.1.
Example 9.3. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(0, 6) (4, 8) (8, 7)
(1, 5) (5, 4) (7, 3)
(2, 2) (3, 0) (6, 1).
The southwestern corner of the matrix is a unique Nash equilibrium. The game has even the FIP as well as FSBRP; it is also
SBRDS. However, there is no weakly dominated strategy.
Example 9.4. Let us consider a two person 2× 2 game:
(0, 2) (2, 0)
(1, 1) (1, 1).
The southwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium. The game obviously has the FIP as well as FBRP. On the other hand,
each strategy of each player is a best response to a strategy of the partner; therefore, the game is not SBRDS.
Example 9.5. Let us consider a two person 2× 3 game:
(3, 2) (1, 3) (1, 3)
(3, 2) (2, 1) (0, 0).
There are two Nash equilibria: the northeastern and southwestern corners. The game has the FSBRP: the longest possible
simultaneous Cournot path starts from the southeastern corner and then passes through all non-equilibrium strategy
profiles. On the other hand, there is no BR-dominance of any kind between the strategies of player 1; among the strategies of
player 2, there is only non-strict BR-dominance in an intermediate sense between the second and third columns. Therefore,
the game is not SBRDS, nor even I!BRDS. (On the other hand, it isweakly dominance solvable)
Example 9.6 shows that both Theorems 6.1 and 7.2 are wrong for more than two players; Example 9.7 shows the same
for Theorems 6.2 and 7.1.
Example 9.6. Let us consider a three person 2× 2× 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns, and player 3
matrices):
(3, 4, 3) (0, 0, 0)
(5, 5, 5) (4, 3, 4)
 
(2, 2, 1) (1, 1, 2)
(0, 0, 0) (2, 2, 1).

The southwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium; the FBRP is easy to check. On the other hand, each strategy of each
player is the unique best response to a strategy profile of the partners. Therefore, the game is not even WBRDS.
Example 9.7. Let us consider a three person 2× 2× 2 game (where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns, and player 3
matrices):
(2, 1, 2) (4, 4, 4)
(0, 0, 0) (1, 3, 3)
 
(0, 0, 0) (3, 2, 1)
(4, 4, 4) (0, 0, 0).

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The two Nash equilibria are not underlined. Each of the three strategy profiles underlined once is dominated in the sense of
◃sBR only by a Nash equilibrium; each of the three strategy profiles underlined twice is dominated in the same sense only
by a strategy profile underlined once. Thus, the game has the FSBRP. On the other hand, each strategy of each player is a
unique best response to a strategy profile of the partners. Therefore, the game is not even WBRDS.
Example 9.8 shows that the adjectives ‘‘weak’’ in the corollary to Theorem 6.1 cannot be dropped.
Example 9.8. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(1, 3) (5, 2) (0, 0)
(3, 1) (0, 0) (1, 3)
(0, 0) (4, 4) (4, 4).
The game has even the FIP; the southeastern corner of the matrix is a unique Nash equilibrium. In accordance with
Theorem 7.2, it is WBRDS. However, it does not have the FSBRP: the profiles on the diagonal with utilities (0, 0) form a
simultaneous Cournot cycle.
Example 9.9 shows that BR-dominance solvability in an intermediate sense cannot be asserted in Theorem 6.1 or 6.2.
Example 9.10 shows that weak dominance solvability does not imply strict BR-dominance solvability in an intermediate
sense (although implying the ‘‘non-strict’’ version of the property).
Example 9.9. Let us consider a two person 6× 6 game defined by the left matrix:
(3, 3) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2)
(0, 0) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1)
(0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, 2)
(1, 2) (1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2) (0, 0) (2, 1)

0 4 2 4 4 2
3 4 3 4 5 3
3 4 4 5 4 3
5 5 5 6 5 6
3 4 3 4 4 3
1 5 2 5 4 2.

The northwestern corner is a unique Nash equilibrium. The weak FSBRP is easy to check: the right matrix shows the length
of the shortest simultaneous Cournot path leading to the equilibrium from every strategy profile. By Proposition 5.4, the
game has the weak FBRP as well. On the other hand, none of the sets R−1i (xi) include each other for either i ∈ N , even if
non-strict inclusion is taken into account. Therefore, no strategy is BR-dominated in an intermediate sense.
Example 9.10. Let us consider the following bimatrix game:
(3, 3) (2, 2) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1).
The middle column weakly dominates the right one; when the latter is deleted, the upper row becomes strictly dominant.
Therefore, the game is weakly dominance solvable. On the other hand, none of the strategies is strictly BR-dominated in an
intermediate sense: each row is the unique best response to a column; the left column is the unique best response to the
upper row; both other columns are only best responses to the bottom row.
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